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1 Introduction
You receive an email from your boss stating that he must nominate exactly
two sta¤ as trade union representatives as soon as possible. All sta¤ would
like that someone represents them on the union, but the question is who? If
no-one else volunteers, or if at least two others volunteer, there is no sense in
you volunteering. If only one person volunteers then the outcome depends
on you. You click reply and hesitate... how do your colleagues choose?
The story illustrates the participation problem in the private provision of
discrete public goods. Grander scale examples might include international
economic agreements, open source software, and political representation. A
useful framework for analysing the issue is found in the seminal work of Pal-
frey & Rosenthal (1984) (P&R). They identify two types of equilibria, that
where no-one participates and that where exactly those needed for provi-
sion do so. This dichotomy exposes two fundamental problems, concerning
e¢ ciency (since all individuals would be better o¤ with provision than with-
out) and coordination (since there are multiple provision equilibria). The
problems can neither be solved by evoking the renement of strict equilib-
rium nor by using refunds, that is returning costs if there are insu¢ cient
participants. However, P&R show that taken together, these two factors can
achieve e¢ ciency: with refunds, all strict equilibria are e¢ cient.
These important insights presume that individuals maximise material
payo¤s. But scholars argue that in the context of public goods provision
it is natural for additional motives such as reciprocity to come into play
(Sugden 1984).1 Reciprocity can be modelled as the desire to be kind to
those who are kind to you and unkind to those who are unkind to you (Ra-
bin 1993, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004 (D&K), Falk & Fischbacher 2006).
In settings where it is benecial that everyone contributes, the application
of reciprocity theory is straightforward and leads to conditional cooperation:
players desire to contribute increases as others contributions go up. Em-
pirical support for such behaviour has been provided (Keser & van Winden
2000, Fischbacher, Gächter & Fehr 2001, Fischbacher & Gächter 2010) via
experimental public good games (Ledyard 1995). However, in discrete public
goods games it isnt useful, but rather wasteful, to contribute if many others
do so anyway, so the implications of reciprocity are not obvious. Will reci-
1Reciprocity is not the only important social preference in such environments. Makris
(2009) considers altruism and Rothenhäusler et al. (2013) a form of guilt.
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procity make it easier to decide how to reply to your bossemail? Will it
solve the e¢ ciency and coordination problems? Answers require systematic
analysis.
We use the workhorse model of P&R and conceptualise reciprocity as
in the D&K model. Cost-sharing, where individuals reduce each others
cost-burden if the number of participants exceeds that needed for provision,
proves crucial. P&Rs insights are robust to reciprocity and cost-sharing,
taken individually. However, with both reciprocity and cost-sharing in the
picture, conclusions are dramatically di¤erent. There may exist a unique
e¢ cient rened equilibrium so the coordination problem can be solved. But
results on this potential are marvelously intricate, with possibilities as well
as dead ends in the form of multiplicity or non-existence.
To untangle structure, we introduce and study new network notions of
reciprocity relationships that describe the players attitudes towards each
other. Methodologically, we are thus connected to an infant literature on
games with networks of social preferences (Leider et al. 2009, Bourlès &
Bramoullé 2013). Among other things, our approach demonstrates the coor-
dinating power of "reciprocity cliques" in a world of non-reciprocal players
and how "reciprocity alienation" can impede coordination.
Our uniqueness results may seem surprising for those who believe that
"in standard examples, the notion of reciprocal preferences tends to increase
the number of equilibria" (Sobel 2005, p. 410). We examine an economically
important class of games that under standard preferences seems intrinsically
plagued with multiple equilibria, yet reciprocity potentially o¤ers a solution.
Section 2 recaps P&R and adds cost-sharing (2.1), then denes and high-
lights important properties of reciprocity preferences (2.2 & 2.3). Section 3
presents results, on reciprocity in P&R (3.1) and on reciprocity and cost-
sharing (3.2-3). Section 4 examines welfare (4.1) and other social preferences
(4.2), before we conclude in Section 5.
2 Model
2.1 P&R and cost-sharing
We rst recall P&Rs classic participation game. Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be
the set of players, with n  3. Player is strategy set is Si = f0; 1g where 1
corresponds to participating in provision and 0 to not doing so. We focus on
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pure strategies throughout. Let S = i2NSi. Write s = (s1; s2;:::; sn) for a
prole of strategies.
The threshold number of participants for provision of the public good is
w, where 1 < w < n. Let the cost of participation be x 2 (0; 1) and each
player receives an additional payo¤ of 1 if the good is provided. Let i be
player is material payo¤ function.
P&R introduce two variants of their game di¤ering in whether or not
costs are refunded when there are fewer than w participants. To dene
payo¤ functions, let m denote the number of players that participate. With
no refunds, player is material payo¤ function is dened by
No Refunds: i (s) =
8>><>>:
1 if m  w and si = 0;
1  x if m  w and si = 1;
0 if m < w and si = 0;
 x if m < w and si = 1.
(1)
Any prole where m = 0 or m = w is a Nash equilibrium, and in fact also a
strict equilibrium.
P&R show that refunds imply the ine¢ cient no participation outcome is
no longer a strict equilibrium. With refunds, is material payo¤ function is
dened by
Refunds: i (s) =
8<:
1 if m  w and si = 0;
1  x if m  w and si = 1;
0 if m < w:
(2)
While any prole where m = w remains a strict equilibrium, m = 0 does not
because deviation to participation would be costless. All strict equilibria are
thus e¢ cient.
We will additionally consider a counterpart to refunds for m > w, cost-
sharing, where costs in excess of the provision cost are returned in equal
shares to the participating players when m > w. Player is material payo¤
function is then dened by
Cost-sharing: i (s) =
8<:
1 if m  w and si = 0;
1  w
m
x if m  w and si = 1;
0 if m < w.
(3)
In some contexts cost-sharing is very natural. For instance, in our opening
example 2 workers were needed to be union representatives. Suppose that 4
4
workers volunteer. Distributing the union tasks between the 4 seems more
reasonable than making all 4 work on every task.
If players are motivated by material payo¤s alone, pure strategy Nash
and strict equilibria are una¤ected by cost-sharing as it only a¤ects payo¤s
when m > w and such proles are neither equilibria nor attractive proles to
deviate to given the waste involved.2 However with reciprocity motivation
cost-sharing will matter.
2.2 Reciprocity: denitions
We next incorporate preferences for reciprocity. Following D&K,3 when
player i plays strategy si and holds (point) belief (bij)j 6=i 2
Q
j 6=i Sj about
other playersstrategies, is kindness to player j is
ij

si; (bij)j 6=i

= j

si; (bij)j 6=i

 1
2

max
s0i
j

s0i; (bij)j 6=i

+min
s0i
j

s0i; (bij)j 6=i

:
(4)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (4) is the material payo¤ that i
believes that j receives. To dene kindness, this payo¤must be compared to
some reference point. The reference point is the second term, the average of
the highest and the lowest material payo¤ i believes he could "give" to j. If
ij (:) > 0, i is kind to j, if ij (:) < 0, i is unkind to j and if ij (:) = 0, i
has zero kindness to j.
To illustrate, take the game with no refunds (material payo¤ function
(1)). Let n = 3, w = 2 and x = 1
2
. Suppose that player 1 believes that only
player 3 is participating (b12 = 0, b13 = 1). Player 1 is then kind to both
players if he participates (12 (1; (0; 1)) = 1   12 (0 + 1) = 12 ; 13 (1; (0; 1)) =
1
2
 1
2
  1
2
+ 1
2

= 1
2
) and unkind to both players if he does not (12 (0; (0; 1)) =
0  1
2
(0 + 1) =  1
2
; 13 (0; (0; 1)) =  12   12
  1
2
+ 1
2

=  1
2
).
2It would however a¤ect Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, as allowed for in P&R, and
also has implications in related games. For example, Shinohara (2009) where players have
heterogenous valuations of the public good and Makris (2009) where there is incomplete
information over whether or not players are altruistic.
3D&Ks theory of reciprocity applies to a rather general class of extensive game forms.
Our focus on a specic class of games a¤ords us two simplications: (i) we need not
condition strategies and beliefs on histories as the game has simultaneous moves; (ii) we
need not discuss D&Ks notion of "ine¢ cient strategies" (p. 276) as there are no such
strategies.
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Analogously to kindness, when i holds (point) belief bij about js strat-
egy and (point) belief (cijk)k 6=j 2
Q
k 6=j Sk about js belief other players
strategies, is perceived kindness of j towards i is
iji

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

= i

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

 1
2
"
max
b0ij
i

b0ij; (cijk)k 6=j

+min
b0ij
i

b0ij; (cijk)k 6=j
#
:
(5)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (5) is the material payo¤ that i
believes that j believes that i receives. The reference point is the average of
the highest and the lowest material payo¤ that i believes that j believes that
he could give to i. If iji (:) > 0, i perceives that j is kind to him... etc.
Player is utility is the sum of his material and reciprocity payo¤s:
Ui

s;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

(6)
= i (s)| {z }
material payo¤
+
X
j2Nnfig

Yij  ij

si; (bij)j 6=i

 iji

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

| {z }
reciprocity payo¤
;
where Yij  0 is is reciprocity sensitivity towards j. If Yij > 0, a preference
for reciprocation is captured by is utility increasing when ij (:) and iji (:)
are non-zero with matching signs, reecting mutual kindness or unkindness.
The assumption that Yij is common knowledge is clearly restrictive. It
does however make sense with a small group of familiar players, for example
a work team or the set of chief politicians. It may also be approximately
true for people who self-select into a group. Might people who work for a
charity have similar Yij? Common knowledge is perhaps more likely when
preferences are very similar. Extending the model to asymmetric information
is beyond our scope, but an important avenue for future work.
Finally, we state the two solution concepts we use. Note that we may
write s = (si; s i) where s i is a prole of strategies for all players except i.
Denition 1 (SRE) Prole s is a sequential reciprocity equilibrium (SRE)
if for all i 2 N
1. Ui

s;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

 Ui

(s0i; s i) ;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

for all s0i,
2. cijk = bjk = sk for all j 6= i and k 6= j.
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The rst condition requires that i is best-responding given othersstrategies
and his beliefs. The second demands that players hold correct beliefs. If
for all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0, then Denition 1 describes a Nash equilibrium (+
correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payo¤s.
While a unilateral deviation from a SRE cannot increase the deviators
payo¤, such a deviation from a SSRE leads to an actual loss:
Denition 2 (SSRE) Prole s is a strict sequential reciprocity equilibrium
(SSRE) if for all i 2 N
1. Ui

s;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

> Ui

(s0i; s i) ;

bij; (cijk)k 6=j

j 6=i

for all s0i 6= si,
2. cijk = bjk = sk for all j 6= i and k 6= j.
If for all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0, Denition 2 describes a strict equilibrium (+
correct beliefs) in a game where utility equals material payo¤s.
2.3 Reciprocity: highlighted properties
We now draw attention to properties of reciprocity theory in our model that
will help in understanding results.
Psychological game theory
Reciprocity theory (Rabin 1993, D&K 2004) is developed within the frame-
work of psychological game theory (Geanakopolos et al. 1989, Battigalli &
Dufwenberg 2009), where in contrast to classical game theory utilities depend
not only on actions chosen, but potentially also on belief hierarchies. Con-
sider the following example for a motivational dependence that psychological
games can capture but classical games cannot.
Example 0: Let n = 3 and w = 2. Suppose player 1 believes that only
player 3 is participating (b12 = 0, b13 = 1). Does player 2 deserve negative
reciprocity from player 1? According to D&K this depends on 1s beliefs
about 2s beliefs about others strategies. Contrast when 1 believes 2 be-
lieves that only 3 is participating (c121 = 0; c123 = 1), with when 1 believes 2
believes that no-one is participating (c121 = 0; c123 = 0). Only in the former
case does 1 believe that 2 believes himself to be pivotal for the goods provi-
sion and thus intentionally lowers 1s payo¤. By (5), 1 perceives 2 as unkind
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in the former case
 
121 (0; (0; 1)) = 0  12 (0 + 1) =  12

and as having zero
kindness in the latter
 
121 (0; (0; 0)) = 0  12 (0 + 0) = 0

. In a psychologi-
cal game 1 may react di¤erently in these two cases. Indeed, D&K permit
negative reciprocity in the former but not in the latter (applying (6)). Clas-
sical game theory would not allow distinct reactions since 1 believes the same
action prole is played in both cases.
Pivotality and kindness
Reciprocity incentives in Example 0 depend on the perceived ability of player
2 to inuence player 1s material payo¤, his pivotality.4 Non-pivotality will
drive many of our results. Payo¤ functions (1)-(3) imply i is non-pivotal for
js material payo¤ if the good will either: (a) not be provided regardless of
is strategy choice, or; (b) be provided regardless of is strategy choice and
j is not participating so incurs no costs, or; (c) be provided regardless of is
strategy choice and j participates but there is no cost-sharing so i cannot
reduce js cost-share by participating.
Applying cases (a)-(c) to kindness functions (4) and (5), we can establish
two lemmas showing that non-pivotality implies zero kindness. These will be
useful when stating and proving later results.
If i believes he is non-pivotal for js material payo¤ then both his strate-
gies have a kindness towards j equal to zero, ij (:) = 0 (apply (4)).
Lemma 1 (Zero kindness) For some i; j 2 N , (bij)j 6=i and all si 2 Si,
ij (:) = 0 if and only if i believes that either:
(a) there are fewer than w   1 participants excluding i, or that,
(b) there are at least w participants excluding i and j is not participating,
or that,
(c) there are at least w participants excluding i and j is participating, but
there is no cost-sharing.
Similarly if i believes that j believes that j is non-pivotal for is material
payo¤, both of js strategies have a perceived kindness towards i equal to
zero, iji (:) = 0.
4See Bartling et al. (2015) for an experiment where a similar notion of pivotality plays
an important role in explaining behaviour.
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Lemma 2 (Zero perceived kindness) For some i; j 2 N; (cijk)k 6=j and
all bij 2 Sj, iji (:) = 0 if and only if i believes that j believes that either:
(a) there are fewer than w   1 participants excluding j, or that,
(b) there are at least w participants excluding j and i is not participating,
or that,
(c) there are at least w participants excluding j and i is participating but
there is no cost-sharing.
It follows from these lemmas that either both strategies have zero (perceived)
kindness, or one is (perceived as) kind and the other unkind (see (4) and
(5)). It also follows from the lemmas that when beliefs are in equilibrium,
ij (:) = 0 if and only if jij (:) = 0:
If for some players i and j either of the lemmas hold, then j o¤ers i no
reciprocity incentive (because ij (:)  iji (:) = 0 in (6)). Furthermore, if this
is true for all j, then is strategy choice is determined by material payo¤s
alone even if Yij > 0 for some j (see (6)). It does not however follow that is
behaviour in SRE (SSRE) is identical to that in NE (strict equilibria) since
othersbehaviour may still be motivated by reciprocity incentives and thus
is best response may di¤er.
3 Results
Does reciprocity matter in discrete public good games? The answer is essen-
tially no in P&Rs setting (3.1). The power of reciprocity is unlocked if one
considers cost-sharing, as we show rst relying on examples (3.2) and then
via formal statements that generalise those examples (3.3). All proofs are
found in the appendix; we provide only the main intuition in the text.
3.1 Reciprocity in P&R
The following proposition characterises reciprocity equilibria in P&Rs game.
Proposition 1 (Reciprocity in P&R) (i) With no refunds, the set of
SRE equals the set of SSRE and is independent of Yij. (ii) With refunds,
the set of SSRE is independent of Yij.
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It follows from the proposition, and the insight that P&Rs model may be
seen as the special case where for all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0, that P&Rs results are
robust to the incorporation of reciprocity. Without refunds there are both
equilibrium e¢ ciency and coordination problems; refunds and strictness deal
with the e¢ ciency problem. The intuition is as follows:
Without refunds, ine¢ cient no-participation remains an equilibrium de-
spite reciprocity as each player believes he is not pivotal, thus faces no reci-
procity incentives (Lemma 1(a)). Furthermore, since deviation incurs a ma-
terial cost, no participation is also a SSRE.
With refunds, the set of SRE does depend on Yij.5 However, this is
of little relevance to us as reasoning analogous to the previous paragraph
demonstrates the ine¢ cient SRE still exists. We thus have the same moti-
vation to focus on SSRE in Proposition 1(ii) as P&R had to focus on strict
equilibria. To see that ine¢ cient proles cannot be SSRE, reason as follows.
If there are more than w participants, each participant believes he is not
pivotal (Lemma 1(b) and 1(c)) and thus has no reciprocity incentives. Since
deviating increases his material payo¤, this is not an SSRE. For a prole with
a number of participants strictly between 0 and w, each participant again
believes he is not pivotal (Lemma 1(a)). This time deviating gives the same
material payo¤ and thus the player incurs no strict loss in utility. Finally,
for a no-participation prole, deviation by any does not strictly reduce his
utility. All that remains are the e¢ cient proles, those with w participants.
The central reason why reciprocity has no bite in tackling multiplicity is
zero (perceived) kindness due to non-participant non-pivotality in strategy
proles with w participants. To illustrate, let n = 3, w = 2 and consider
a candidate equilibrium where only players 2 and 3 participate. Player 2
is pivotal and equilibrium beliefs imply 1 perceives 2 as kind. However,
even if Y12 > 0, 1 believes he is not pivotal for 2s payo¤ (Lemma 1(c))
thus cannot reciprocate 2s kindness. Furthermore, equilibrium beliefs also
mean that 2 acknowledges 1s perceived non-pivotality (Lemma 2(c)) and so
does not treat his non-participation as unkind. Thus 1 provides 2 with no
reciprocity incentive to deviate, even if Y21 > 0. By contrast (anticipating
subsections 3.2-3) if there were cost-sharing these latent reciprocity incentives
are reignited in such instances by allowing 1 to inuence 2s payo¤. This may
5For those interested, the set of SRE is a superset of that where for all i; j 2 N ,
Yij = 0. The only di¤erence arises for proles where m = w   1 which are SRE if and
only if non-participants are su¢ ciently reciprocal towards one another.
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motivate deviations and gain traction on multiplicity.
3.2 Reciprocity & cost-sharing: examples
Reciprocity has a potentially dramatic e¤ect under cost-sharing. Not only
does the set of SSRE now depend on Yij, but uniqueness becomes a possibility.
The coordination problem can thus potentially be solved.
Our results will depend on preferences, specically the distribution of
players reciprocity sensitivities, the "reciprocity network". It is useful to
represent this using weighted directed graphs. Vertices represent players and
their labels correspond to player labels. A directed edge originating from
player is vertex and ending at player js vertex implies Yij > 0. The edge
label is Yij. Figure 1, for example, represents a 3-player network where for
all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0 except that Y12 = Y21 = 6.
1
2 3
66
Figure 1: A reciprocity network
We now dene our rst network notion of reciprocity and illustrate unique-
ness.
Denition 3 (Reciprocity clique of strength ) A set of players L 
N is a reciprocity clique of strength  if for all i; j 2 L, Yij; Yji   > 0.
A reciprocity clique may represent a form of friendship.6 It seems unlikely in
hierarchical relationships such as those between a rm and workers (cf. D&K
2000) but plausible among peers. A su¢ ciently strong reciprocity clique may
overcome the coordination problem as we illustrate in Example 1.
Example 1: Let n = 3, w = 2 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure 1.
Full participation cannot be a SSRE as player 3 would deviate. Player 3 and
6Reciprocating unkindness is probably not a particularly common feature of enduring
friendships however!
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just one of the clique members participating cannot be either, since the non-
participant clique members reciprocity gain from reducing the cost-share of
the participating member is greater than his material cost of participation.
This leaves only the clique participating as the unique SSRE. The coordina-
tion problem is solved.
Compare this to the case without cost-sharing. Only player 3 and one clique
member participating would then remain SSRE (see discussion at the end of
Section 3.1), so multiplicity would follow.
The existence of a clique is not generally su¢ cient for uniqueness as Ex-
ample 2 will show. It also illustrates our second network notion of reciprocity.
Denition 4 (Reciprocity alienation) A set of players L  N is reci-
procity alienated if for all i 2 L and all j 2 NnL, Yij = Yji = 0.
Players being reciprocity alienated neither implies nor is implied by them
having selsh preferences. For example, players in L having positive reci-
procity sensitivities towards one another does not contradict alienation; and,
a player not in L with a positive reciprocity sensitivity towards a player in L
implies L is not alienated. Intuitively, the notion implies that players inside
the alienated group provide no reciprocity incentives to those outside the
group, and vice-versa.
Our next example adds a non-reciprocal player to Example 1 to illus-
trate the coordination problems caused by alienation and that a clique is not
su¢ cient for coordination.
Example 2: Let n = 4, w = 2 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure
2.
1 2
3 4
6
6
Figure 2: Reciprocity Alienation
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Uniqueness is now impossible despite the reciprocity clique. A SSRE with
only 1 and 2 participating exists; however, there also exists one where only
3 and 4 participate. Alienation implies there are no reciprocity incentives
acting across the pairs to break the equilibria.
Although both examples have cliques and multiple sets of alienated play-
ers, there is uniqueness in the rst example and multiplicity in the second.
The di¤erence arises because Example 2 has multiple sets of alienated play-
ers of size w, whereas Example 1 does not. Section 3.3 shows that multiple
alienated sets of this size prevents uniqueness more generally. Example 3
illustrates how a clique can recover uniqueness.
Example 3: Let n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5 and the reciprocity network be as
in Figure 3.
1 2
3 4
55
6
6
Figure 3: Preventing alienation
Players 3 and 4 only participating is now not a SSRE as player 1(2) has an
incentive to deviate: the gain from reciprocating the kindness of player 3(4)
is greater than the material cost. All proles except where only the clique
participate can be excluded, uniqueness thus re-emerges.
Example 3 illustrates how a clique being reciprocal towards non-clique
players avoids alienation and can imply uniqueness. These precise numbers
are not necessary for coordination (see Section 3.3 for uniqueness with general
reciprocity networks).
The nal example concerns networks with high reciprocity sensitivities.
Given that multiple equilibria exist with standard preferences one may con-
jecture that su¢ ciently high reciprocity sensitivity solves the coordination
problem. This is not necessarily true, however.
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Example 4: Let n = 4, x = 0:5 and the reciprocity network be as in Figure
4.
1 2
3 4
Yij 13
Figure 4: High reciprocity sensitivity
Consider two cases, rst w = 3. Three participants cannot be a SSRE as the
non-participant deviates since his reciprocity gain from doing so outweighs
his material cost. Full participation is the unique SSRE. Now suppose w = 2
and 3 players are participating. Participants have no incentive to deviate as
their reciprocity gain from reciprocating the kindness of fellow participants is
greater than the material cost. Non-participants do not deviate either since
equilibrium beliefs imply they perceive a particular participants kindness
towards them as zero (Lemma 2(b)). Thus, there are multiple SSRE.
More generally high reciprocity gives uniqueness if and only if w = n  1;
see Section 3.3. Example 4 also illustrates that there may be more than w
participants in a unique SSRE. We show that any number between w and n
can be consistent with uniqueness in the next section.
To summarise the insights from Examples 1-4.
1. Existence of a unique SSRE is possible with cost-sharing and reciprocity
(Examples 1, 3 and 4).
2. Reciprocity alienation can prevent uniqueness (Example 2).
3. A su¢ ciently strong reciprocity clique with positive reciprocity sensi-
tivities towards players outside the clique can imply a unique SSRE
(Example 3).
4. High reciprocity sensitivities do not necessarily imply uniqueness or
multiplicity of SSRE (Example 4).
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Readers looking mainly for key intuitions exhibited by typical examples
may now skip to Section 4. Readers interested in seeing some more general
formal statements, plus further details, should continue to Section 3.3.
3.3 Reciprocity & cost-sharing: details
First we describe the SSRE of our model. For strategy prole s, letM denote
the associated set of participating players and m be the cardinality of M .
Proposition 2 (Cost-sharing equilibria) With cost-sharing, all SSRE in-
volve provision of the public good. Prole s where m = w is a SSRE if and
only if for all i 2M ,
1  x+ (1  x)
2
2
X
j2Mnfig
Yij >
x
2 (w + 1)
X
j2NnM
Yij, (7)
and for all i 2 NnM , X
j2M
Yij < 2w: (8)
Prole s where m > w is a SSRE if and only if for all i 2M ,X
j2Mnfig
Yij >
2m (m  1)2
wx
. (9)
The conditions for a SSREwithm = w are understood as follows. Participant
non-deviation (7) requires that the gain from reciprocating the kindness of
other participants (who intentionally provide the good) and the material gain
from provision, be greater than the loss of not reciprocating the unkindness
of non-participants (who intentionally do not reduce the participants cost-
share). Non-participant non-deviation (8) demands the material savings be
greater than the reciprocity cost of not reciprocating participant kindness.
As non-participants are not pivotal for each others material payo¤s (Lemma
1(b)) they provide no reciprocity incentives to one another.
For a SSRE with m > w a non-deviation condition is not needed for non-
participants since each non-participant believes no-one thought they were
pivotal for his payo¤ (Lemma 2(b)), implying zero perceived kindness. Par-
ticipant non-deviation (9) requires the gain from reciprocating the kindness
of fellow participants be greater than the material cost.
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Note that Proposition 2 does not guarantee existence of SSRE. To see
one instance of non-existence suppose that for all i; j 2 N , Yij  2w, so that
(8) does not hold. Then take x su¢ ciently small such that (9) does not hold.
Cliques coordinating a selsh world
Examples 1 and 3 demonstrated the potential of a reciprocity clique to co-
ordinate behaviour among selsh players. The next two results describe a
fairly rich set of circumstances where this is true.
Proposition 3 (Clique with w members) LetM 0  N be such that jM 0j =
w and suppose that,
(a) for all i 2 NnM 0 and j 2 N , Yij = 0,
(b) for all i 2M 0 and j 2 NnM 0, Yij  2w,
(c) for all i 2M 0,X
j2M 0nfig
Yij >
x (n  w)
(w + 1) (1  x)2
X
j2NnM 0
Yij   2
1  x: (10)
There then exists a unique SSRE prole s where M =M 0.
The class of networks referred to in Proposition 3 involves a cliqueM 0 of size
w with (a) selsh non-clique players, (b) each clique member being su¢ ciently
reciprocal towards each non-clique player, and (c) each clique member being
su¢ ciently reciprocal towards the rest of the clique.
To understand why such networks imply uniqueness see Example 3 (which
satises conditions (a)-(c) of Proposition 3) or reason as follows. Condition
(a) implies that if there were more than w participants, a participating non-
clique player would deviate. Condition (b) implies that if there were w par-
ticipants and a clique member were not participating he would deviate to
reciprocate the kindness of participating non-clique players ((8) is violated).
Provision by the clique is thus the unique SSRE, with condition (a) guaran-
teeing that non-participants do not deviate, and condition (c) ensuring that
participants do not either.
It is instructive to study (10) to appreciate what determines the level
of intra-clique sensitivity needed to sustain the unique SSRE. A higher n
or lower w implies a larger number of unkind non-clique players, increasing
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the incentive for clique members to deviate. A higher intra-clique sensitivity
is thus required to prevent deviation. A higher x implies a decrease in the
net material gain from provision, an increase in the unkindness of non-clique
players and a decrease in the kindness of clique players. All these e¤ects
increase clique membersincentive to deviate, thus once again, a higher clique
sensitivity is required to sustain the unique SSRE.
Our next result, Proposition 4, will consider uniqueness with provision
by a clique of size greater than w. To better understand the rationale for
the class of networks that we will describe in the proposition, it is helpful
to return to the networks of Proposition 3 and understand why analogous
structures could not give uniqueness with a clique of size greater than w.
Condition (c) of Proposition 3 allows the clique to have homogenous or
heterogenous intra-clique reciprocity sensitivities. Homogeneity may be in-
consistent with uniqueness if the clique is of size greater than w. For the
sharpest illustration of why, consider a clique of size w+2 with homogenous
intra-clique sensitivities. Condition (9) shows that the intra-clique sensitivity
required for a SSRE with the entire clique participating is greater than that
required for one with only w+1 clique members participating. Hence, if there
exists a SSRE with the entire clique providing, it is not unique. This issue
did not arise with a clique of size w (Proposition 3) since a proper subset
participating is insu¢ cient for provision.
With appropriate heterogeneity, unique provision by a larger clique is
possible. This is demonstrated by the special case examined in Proposition 4.
Clique members are arranged in a "circle" and each member i is particularly
reciprocal towards one of his "neighbours" (called i+ in Proposition 4).
Proposition 4 (Clique with > w members) LetM 0 = f1; 2; :::;m0g where
m0 > w. Dene i+ = (imodm0) + 1. Suppose that
(a) for all i 2 NnM 0 and j 2 N , Yij = 0,
(b) for all i 2M 0 and j 2 NnM 0, Yij  2w,
(c-) for all i 2M 0, Pj2M 0nfi;i+g Yij  2w (w + 1) =x,
(c+) for all i 2M 0, Yii+ > max
n
2w;
 
2m0 (m0   1)2 =wx Pj2M 0nfi;i+g Yijo.
There then exists a unique SSRE prole s where M =M 0.
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The class of networks referred to in Proposition 4 involves a cliqueM 0 of size
greater than w with (a) selsh non-clique players, (b) each clique member
being su¢ ciently reciprocal towards each non-clique player, (c-) each clique
member i being not too reciprocal towards the rest of the clique excluding one
of his neighbours, i+, (c+) each clique member i being su¢ ciently reciprocal
towards one of his neighbours, i+.
Conditions (c-) and (c+) of Proposition 4 ensure clique member is sen-
sitivities towards the clique are su¢ ciently high for a SSRE with the entire
clique participating ((9) holds). That clique member i is highly reciprocal
towards i+ plays a key role in avoiding the multiplicity that we discussed with
homogenous intra-clique sensitivities. To see this, consider a prole where
only a proper subset of the clique participates. There must then be some
participating player i whose neighbour, i+, is not participating. Condition
(c-) then implies that is reciprocity towards participants is not su¢ ciently
high to prevent him deviating ((9) violated), thus this prole cannot be a
SSRE.
To see that the clique provision SSRE is indeed unique, exclude remaining
proles as follows. Condition (a) implies that provision by more than w par-
ticipants with at least one non-clique player participating cannot be SSRE, as
this player would deviate ((9) violated). Conditions (b) and (c+), imply that
w participant proles cannot be SSRE as a non-participating clique member
would deviate ((8) violated). There is thus a unique SSRE.
Propositions 3 and 4 demonstrate that for any n, w and x there always
exist some reciprocity networks that give uniqueness under cost-sharing. The
propositions allow for many constellations of Yij since most the conditions
impose only upper or lower bounds on sensitivities. Note also that the net-
work architectures in the propositions are not necessary for uniqueness. For
instance, the network in Example 4 with w = 3 gave uniqueness despite it
not conforming to the propositionsarchitectures. Finally, since we consider
strict SRE, uniqueness should hold for any small perturbation to the weights
of the reciprocity network.
Coordination di¢ culties
Our insights on reciprocity cliques may make coordination seem easy. In
general, however, coordination via reciprocity networks is far from trivial.
We have already noted equilibrium existence problems. Here follow three
negative observations of reciprocity networks where instead the coordination
problem is very much alive, beginning with alienation.
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Observation 1 (Reciprocity alienation) If there exist two sets of reci-
procity alienated players L0 and L00, such that L0 6= L00and jL0j = jL00j = w,
then there are multiple SSRE.
To see the logic behind the statement, simply note that provision by an
alienated group of size w is a SSRE and multiplicity follows immediately if
there are two such groups (e.g. Example 2).
Having reciprocity incentives throughout the set of players is clearly im-
portant to avoid this outcome. The conditions in Observation 1 are satised
more easily than it may seem. For example, at least w + 1 players with
standard preferences towards whom no-one is particularly reciprocal is su¢ -
cient. Su¢ ciently high reciprocity among all players is however not enough
to prevent multiplicity as our next observation shows.
Observation 2 (High reciprocity) If for all i; j 2 N , Yij > 2 (w + 1) =x,
then there exists a unique SSRE if and only if w = n  1.
When w = n 1 candidate SSRE withm = w are broken as by deviating non-
participants reduce participantscost-shares and reciprocate their kindness
(8), leaving only a SSRE with m = n, (7). When w < n   1, (9) implies
that existence of a SSRE with m = w + 1 is guaranteed if for all i; j 2 N ,
Yij > 2 (w + 1) =x, however there are many such equilibria (see e.g. Example
4 with w = 2).
A direct implication of Observation 2 is that for a high reciprocity net-
work, provision of a public good which requires almost full participation
may be easier than one that requires low participation. Our next observa-
tion points out that low participation public goods are also more di¢ cult to
provide when preferences are homogenous.
Observation 3 (Homogenous reciprocity) If w < n 1 and for all i; j 2
N , Yij = Y , then there exist multiple SSRE.
With homogenous preferences a unique SSRE cannot have less than n par-
ticipants otherwise another SSRE would exist where at least one participant
and non-participant exchange strategies. Furthermore, full participation can-
not be a unique SSRE since the level of reciprocity required for equilibrium
is increasing in the number of participants, (9), so there would also exist
equilibria with fewer participants. Preference heterogeneity is thus often key
to coordination via reciprocity networks.
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4 Extensions
4.1 Welfare
We have so far implicitly dened e¢ ciency in terms of material payo¤s. This
is not obvious given that utility functions are assumed to be a combination
of both material and reciprocity payo¤s. While some scholars have argued
that welfare should be dened on full utility functions (e.g. Rabin 1993, p.
1294), more generally the jury remains out on whether non-material payo¤s in
social preference models should be included in normative analysis (Bernheim
& Rangel 2005).
If one were to dene e¢ ciency on full utility functions, it is important
to recognise that utilities are a function of kindness and perceived kindness,
which themselves are a function of both beliefs and strategies. Any e¢ ciency
denition must thus account for beliefs as well as strategies. In this section
we shall consider the implications of Pareto e¢ ciency dened on full utility
functions where beliefs are correct.
Using this revised e¢ ciency denition we can illustrate an interesting
implication of including reciprocity payo¤s. Recall P&R with neither refunds
nor cost-sharing. Let n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5, player 1 be alienated and the
others form a clique of strength 3. Player 1 only participating, so that players
2, 3 and 4 are all unkind to each other, is now e¢ cient as one can show that
at least one clique member must get strictly lower utility in all other proles.
Reciprocation of unkindness may not seem "normatively desirable."
In the remainder of this section we explain the main implications of our
reciprocity-inclusive e¢ ciency denition for our game. With neither refunds
nor cost-sharing it remains the case that any w participant SRE is Pareto
superior to the no-participation SRE. To see this, note that all players receive
strictly higher material payo¤s in former prole; non-participants receive zero
reciprocity payo¤ in both proles; and participants reciprocate each others
kindness so receive a higher reciprocity payo¤ in former prole.
Although the ine¢ ciency problem remains, P&Rs refunds may no longer
recover e¢ ciency. For example, take P&R with refunds but not cost-sharing,
let n = 3, w = 2, x = 0:5 and all Yij = 0 except Y21 > 8. Despite players 1
and 2 only participating and players 1 and 3 only participating both being
SSRE, the former now Pareto dominates the latter as 1 receives the same
utility and 2 and 3 receive higher utility (2 a higher reciprocity payo¤ and 3
a higher material payo¤).
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While the set of SSRE may be (partially) Pareto rankable, transitivity of
the Pareto criterion implies that there exists some subset of SSRE undomi-
nated by other SSRE. This subset is in fact e¢ cient overall. Take an SSRE
from the subset and rule out Pareto improvements as follows: if m > w, a
non-participant in the SSRE who now participates gets strictly lower ma-
terial payo¤ and an identical reciprocity payo¤ (Lemma 1(b) and 1(c)); if
m < w  1, a participant in the SSRE gets strictly lower material payo¤ and
no higher reciprocity payo¤ (Lemma 1(a)); if m = w 1, a participant in the
SSRE who is now a non-participant gets a strictly lower material payo¤ and
a no higher reciprocity payo¤ (Lemma 1(a)).
In Section 3 the set of e¢ cient proles was xed and the reciprocity
network determined equilibrium behaviour. With reciprocity included in
the e¢ ciency denition, the reciprocity network simultaneously determines
which strategy proles are e¢ cient and equilibrium behaviour. Is a unique
and e¢ cient SSRE still attainable with cost-sharing? Recall Example 3 from
Section 3.3 to see that the answer is yes: n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5 and for
all i; j 2 N , Yij = 0 except Y13 = Y24 = 5 and Y12 = Y21 = 6, implying a
unique SSRE with the clique participating. This is e¢ cient since any other
prole either involves non-provision or player 3 and/or 4 participating, hence
3 and/or 4 being strictly worse o¤. Since Proposition 3 is established by
generalising the logic of this example, a unique and e¢ cient SSRE remains
possible.
4.2 Networks of social preferences
One might be curious to know whether our results with reciprocity are similar
to those under other social preferences models. As one may expect, our
ndings do not generally hold for other models. We identify some similarities
and di¤erences to better understand what drives our results on reciprocity.
Consider simple forms of altruism (cf. Andreoni 1989) and di¤erence-
aversion (cf. Fehr & Schmidt 1999, Bolton & Ockenfels 2000). An altruistic
player is preferences are represented by Ui (s) = i (s)+
P
j 6=i ijj (s), where
ij  0 denotes is altruism towards player j. A di¤erence-averse is pref-
erences are represented by Ui (s) = i (s) 
P
j 6=i ij (ji (s)  j (s)j), where
ij  0 is is sensitivity to payo¤ di¤erences with j.
Given that our objective is to identify the drivers of our results, we use
forms of altruism and di¤erence-aversion that seem comparable to D&K in
the following senses: material and social preference payo¤s are additively
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separable; i is permitted to have heterogeneous preference parameters to-
wards di¤erent j; and the domain of preference parameters is not bounded
from above.7
One might conjecture that equilibria with these distributional social pref-
erence models will always di¤er from reciprocity since some D&K incentives
cannot exist in such models (e.g. Example 0). For a case where the sets of
equilibria are identical, consider altruistic players with refunds only. Devia-
tion from an e¢ cient prole, those with w participants, reduces the deviators
material payo¤ and cannot increase otherspayo¤s, thus the prole is a strict
equilibrium. As no other proles are strict equilibria, the set of strict equi-
libria is independent of ij (cf. Proposition 1(ii)), hence P&Rs refund result
is robust to altruism.
For a very di¤erent outcome, consider di¤erence-averse players with re-
funds only. Let n = 3, w = 2, x = 0:5 and for all i; j 2 N , ij > 1. There is
then a unique ine¢ cient strict equilibrium with full participation! Materially
e¢ cient proles are not equilibria as deviation secures payo¤ equality.
Comparing the above, we see that the role of pivotality over othersma-
terial payo¤s in D&K is a key driver of Proposition 1. For altruism and
reciprocity, is strategy cannot inuence his social preference payo¤ if he is
non-pivotal. Non-participants in a w participant prole thus have neither
reciprocity (Lemma 1(b) and 1(c)) nor altruism incentives to deviate. For
models where pivotality is not necessary for inuencing the social preference
payo¤ (e.g. di¤erence-aversion), non-participants may deviate and P&R may
not be robust.
Altruism and reciprocity are not similar under cost-sharing. For instance,
consider high social preferences to see that both altruism and di¤erence-
aversion produce di¤erent result to D&K. Recall Example 4 (n = 4, w = 2
and for all i; j, Yij = 13) and contrast the predictions to those of altru-
ism and di¤erence-aversion with su¢ ciently high ij and ij. All proles
with 3 participants are SSRE as the non-participant believes that no partic-
ipant thought himself pivotal for the non-participantspayo¤ (Lemma 2(b)).
By contrast, with su¢ ciently high altruism or di¤erence-aversion, the non-
participant deviates to increase others payo¤s and attain payo¤ equality.
There is thus a unique strict equilibrium of full participation. The di¤erence
7Unboundedness from above also implies that our conclusions would remain una¤ected
were we to replace ij and ij by ij=n and ij=n, as is often done in social preference
models.
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between D&K and other models is driven by the important role of percep-
tions of othersbehaviour in reciprocity theory, a component that is absent
in other models.
Now consider reciprocity networks which imply a unique SSRE. Our ear-
liest instance was Example 1 (n = 3, w = 2, Y12 = Y21 = 6, for all other
i; j 2 N , Yij = 0). Multiplicity was overcome by clique members deviating
from e¢ cient proles unless they play the same strategy, giving a unique
SSRE with only the clique participating. A su¢ ciently strong altruism or
di¤erence-aversion clique would analogously imply uniqueness. The models
give similar results because cost-sharing implies non-participants are pivotal
for participantspayo¤s.
For reciprocity we found that a clique was not su¢ cient for uniqueness
due to alienation (Example 2), but having positive reciprocity sensitivies to-
wards non-clique members achieves uniqueness (Example 3, Propositions 3
and 4). Revisit Example 3 (n = 4, w = 2, x = 0:5) to see that analogous
networks give uniqueness for altruism but not for di¤erence-aversion. Con-
sider an altruism network where 12; 13; 21; 24 > 2 and all other ij = 0.
In any prole with provision other than only the clique (players 1 and 2)
participating, a non-participant clique member or a non-clique player would
deviate, we thus have a unique strict equilibrium with the clique providing.
To see the network architecture in Example 3 will not give uniqueness with
di¤erence aversion, note that player 1 deviating from a prole where only
3 and 4 participate (13 > 2 (1 + 12)) is inconsistent with player 1 not de-
viating from a prole where only 1 and 2 participate (13 < 1). Pivotality
again drives the di¤erence. If only 3 and 4 participate, 1 is non-pivotal for
2s payo¤ so 12 and Y12 have no inuence on is payo¤, whereas 12 does. In
cases like this example, the additional requirements on parameters imposed
by di¤erence-aversion preclude uniqueness.
The above comparisons highlight the important roles played by pivotal-
ity and perceptions of othersbehaviour for our results on reciprocity and
uniqueness. While we can nd some instances of agreement with our model,
one cannot expect our insights on reciprocity to carry over to very di¤er-
ent motivations like altruism and di¤erence-aversion with a high degree of
generality.
23
5 Conclusion
Societies around the world have faced and continue to face great challenges.
A fundamental prerequisite to overcome many of these is the coordination
of social participation. Palfrey & Rosenthal (1984) (P&R) provided an ade-
quate and specic framework for exploring related issues: discrete-level public
goods games, which capture the key problems of private provision of public
goods in condensed form.
Reciprocity is an important form of human motivation which many schol-
ars have suggested may matter in public goods provision settings. We have
explored how the application of a formal model of reciprocity (Dufwenberg
& Kirchsteiger 2004; cf. Rabin 1993) a¤ects predictions in P&Rs context,
with extensions.
A new potential source of coordination power was uncovered: the inter-
action of networks of reciprocity incentives and cost-sharing. In the absence
of cost-sharing, reciprocity does nothing to solve the coordination problem,
P&R is robust. In the absence of reciprocity, cost-sharing has no e¤ect on
coordination. But together, behaviour can be coordinated.
Since cost-sharing can potentially be manipulated by institution design-
ers, understanding its e¤ects seems particularly important. While there is
some experimental work in continuous contribution games (Marks & Croson
1998, Spencer et al. 2009), the conditions under which cost-sharing can co-
ordinate behaviour are poorly understood. Our work suggests that empirical
exploration of its interaction with reciprocity may be worthwhile.
The precise nature of the reciprocity network matters for coordination.
Properties of the network can both help coordination and hinder it. We are
then left with a pressing empirical question: what does the reciprocity net-
work look like in reality? Given its importance and the absence of empirical
research on its nature, addressing this may be of interest for public good
scholars.
Societies probably have new challenges waiting for them. We hope that
by understanding how social participation can be coordinated, resolutions
are less of a struggle, leaving more time to enjoy the public goods produced.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 (Reciprocity in P&R)
(i) No refunds. We identify the sets of SRE and SSRE using arguments
that are independent of Yij. First consider a candidate equilibrium strategy
prole with no participants. Deviation by i gives him a strictly lower material
payo¤ given that w > 1 and does not a¤ect his reciprocity payo¤ since for
all j, ij(0; s i) = ij(1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)). Thus non-participation is
a SRE as well as a SSRE. Second, consider a candidate equilibrium with w
participants. Deviation by i gives him a strictly lower material payo¤. If i
deviates from non-participation, his reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged since for
all j, ij(0; s i) = ij (1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(b)+1(c)). If i deviates from
participation, his reciprocity payo¤ is strictly lower since for all j such that
sj = 1, iji(1; s j) > 0 and ij(1; s i) > ij(0; s i), and for all j such that
sj = 0, iji(0; s j) = 0 (Lemma 2(c)). Thus w participants is a SRE and a
SSRE. To see that there are no more equilibria, take a candidate equilibrium
with some number of participants other than 0 or w. If i deviates from
participation his material payo¤ is strictly higher and his reciprocity payo¤
is unchanged given that for all j, ij (0; s i) = ij (1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)-
1(c)). Thus this prole is neither SRE nor SSRE.
(ii) Refunds. We identify the sets SSRE using arguments that are in-
dependent of Yij. Consider a candidate SSRE prole with w participants.
Deviation by i gives him a strictly lower material payo¤ and no increase in
reciprocity payo¤. More specically, if i deviates from non-participation his
reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged since for all j, ij(0; s i) = ij(1; s i) = 0
(Lemma 1(b)+1(c)); and, if i deviates from participation his reciprocity
payo¤ is strictly lower since for j such that sj = 1, iji(1; s j) > 0 and
ij(1; s i) > ij(0; s i), and for j such that sj = 0, iji(0; s j) = 0 (Lemma
2(c)). Thus w participants is a SSRE. To see that there are no more SSRE,
rst consider a candidate SSRE with more than w participants. If i deviates
from participation, his material payo¤ increases and his reciprocity payo¤ is
unchanged since for all j, ij (0; s i) = ij (1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(b)+1(c)).
Thus this prole is not a SSRE. Second, consider a candidate SSRE with
a number of participants strictly between 0 and w. If i deviates from par-
ticipation both his material and reciprocity payo¤s are unchanged since for
all j, ij(0; s i) = ij(1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)). Thus this prole is not a
SSRE. Finally, consider the candidate SSRE with no participants. Devia-
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tion by i gives him identical material and reciprocity payo¤s since for all j,
ij(0; s i) = ij(1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)). Thus this prole is not a SSRE.

Proof of Proposition 2 (Cost-sharing equilibria)
First show that non-provision proles cannot be SSRE. Consider a candidate
SSRE with no participants. Deviation by i gives him the same material and
reciprocity payo¤s since for all j, ij(0; s i) = ij (1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)).
Thus this is not a SSRE. Consider a candidate SSRE with a number of
participants strictly between 0 and w. If i deviates from participation both
his material and reciprocity payo¤s are unchanged since for all j, ij(0; s i) =
ij(1; s i) = 0 (Lemma 1(a)). Thus this is not a SSRE.
Then identify conditions for provision proles to be SSRE. A SSRE prole
withw participants requires that for all i such that si = 1, ui((1; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)) >
ui((0; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)), hence (7), and that for all i such that si = 0,
ui((0; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)) > ui((1; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)), hence (8). In a SSRE
prole with strictly more thanw participants, if i deviates from non-participation
his material payo¤ is strictly lower and his reciprocity payo¤ is unchanged
since for all j, iji(0; s j) = iji(1; s j) = 0 (Lemma 2(b)). Thus a SSRE
requires only that for all i such that si = 1, ui((1; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)) >
ui((0; s i) ; (s i; (s j)j 6=i)), hence (9). 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Clique with w members)
Reason as follows to see that there is a unique SSRE. First consider a can-
didate SSRE prole with more than w participants. There must exist some
i 2 NnM 0 for whom si = 1. But then for such i, (a) implies that the LHS
of the inequality in (9) is equal to zero. Thus this is not a SSRE. Second,
consider a candidate SSRE prole with w participants where the set of par-
ticipants is not equal to M 0. There must exist some i 2M 0 for whom si = 0
and some j 2 NnM 0 for whom sj = 1. But then for such i, (b) implies that
the LHS of the inequality in (8) is at least 2w. Thus this is not a SSRE.
Consider the only remaining candidate SSRE where the set of participants
equals M 0. For all i 2 M 0 inequality (7) is satised given (b) and (c). The
inequality in (8) is satised given (a). Thus this is the unique SSRE. 
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Proof of Proposition 4 (Clique with > w members)
Reason as follows to see that there is a unique SSRE. First consider a can-
didate SSRE where the set of participants is a proper subset of M 0 with
strictly more than w participants. Given (c-) there must be some i 2 M 0
such that si = 1 for whom
P
j2Mnfig Yij  2w (w + 1) =x. But then for such
i, inequality (9) does not hold. Thus this is not a SSRE. Second, consider a
candidate SSRE where there are strictly more than w participants and the
set of participants is not a subset of M 0. There must be some i 2 NnM 0
such that si = 1. But then for such i, inequality (9) does not hold given (a).
Thus this is not a SSRE. Third, consider a candidate SSRE where there are
w participants. There must exist some i 2 M 0 such that si = 0 for whom
inequality (8) does not hold given (b) and (c+). Thus this is not a SSRE. The
nal candidate SSRE prole is where the set of participants isM 0. Inequality
(9) holds given (c-) and (c+). This is the unique SSRE. 
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